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Abstract.  Security is an important issue when developing complex information systems, however very 
little work has been done in integrating security concerns during the analysis of information 
systems. Current methodologies fail to adequately integrate security and systems 
engineering, basically because they lack concepts and models as well as a systematic 
approach towards security. We believe that security should be considered during the whole 
development process and it should be defined together with the requirements specification. 
This paper introduces extensions to the Tropos methodology to accommodate security. A 
description of new concepts is given along with an explanation of how these concepts are 
integrated to the current stages of Tropos. The above is illustrated using an agent-based 
health and social care information system as a case study. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Analysis is one of the most important stages in the 
whole software engineering process. This is because 
if the analysis of the system is wrong all the 
following stages will end up wrong. It is very 
important during the analysis stage that the software 
engineer understands exactly the problem that they 
have to tackle. This can be a very difficult process 
especially if the system is new and there is no 
previous version of a computer system to serve as a 
model. To understand the problem, the software 
engineer must understand the user needs and 
requirements. Concepts and languages for analysis 
are needed to deal with the system as a whole with 
organisational and coordination properties, as well 
as the individual components of the system and their 
properties. 
Tropos (Castro, 2001) is an information system 
development methodology, tailored to describe both 
the organisational environment of a system and the 
system itself, employing the same concepts 
throughout the development stages. Tropos adopts 
the i* modelling framework (Yu, 1995), which uses 
the concepts of actors, goals, soft goals, tasks, 
resources and social dependencies for defining the 
obligations of actors (dependees) to other actors 
(dependers). Actors have strategic goals and 
intentions within the system or the organisation and 
represent (social) agents (organisational, human or 
software), roles or positions (represents a set of 
roles). A goal represents the strategic interests of an 
actor. In Tropos we differentiate between hard (only 
goals hereafter) and soft goals. The latter having no 
clear definition or criteria for deciding whether they 
are satisfied or not. A task represents a way of doing 
something. Thus, for example a task can be executed 
in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a 
physical or an informational entity while a 
dependency between two actors indicates that one 
actor depends on another to accomplish a goal, 
execute a task, or deliver a resource.   
One distinctive characteristic of Tropos is the 
fact that it covers the very early phases of 
requirements analysis. This allows for a deeper 
understanding of the environment where the 
software must operate, and of the kind of 
interactions that should occur between software and 
human users. By considering early phases of the 
requirements analysis, the main advantage is that 
one can capture not only the what or the how, but 
also the why a piece of software is developed. This, 
in turn, supports a more refined analysis of the 
system dependencies and, in particular, for a much 
better and uniform treatment, not only of the 
system's functional requirements, but also of the 
non-functional requirements (the latter being usually 
very hard to deal with). Tropos covers four main 
software development phases:  
Early Requirements, concerned with the 
understanding of a problem by studying an existing 
organisational setting; the output of this phase is an 
organisational model, which includes relevant actors 
and their respective dependencies;  
 Late requirements, where the system-to-be is 
described within its operational environment, along 
with relevant functions and qualities; this description 
models the system as a (small) number of actors 
which have a number of dependencies with actors in 
their environment; these dependencies define the 
system’s functional and non-functional 
requirements;  
Architectural design, where the system’s global 
architecture is defined in terms of subsystems, 
interconnected through data and control flows; 
within the framework, subsystems are represented as 
actors and data/control interconnections are 
represented as (system) actor dependencies; 
Detailed design, where each architectural 
component is defined in further detail in terms of 
inputs, outputs, control, and other relevant 
information. Tropos is using elements of UML 
(Jacobson, 1999) to complement the features of i*. 
In addition to the graphical representation, 
Tropos provides a formal specification language 
called Formal Tropos (Fuxman, 2001). 
Although Tropos can partially model security 
concerns (Mouratidis, 2002 – Yu, 2002), it has not 
conceived with security in mind and it does not 
provide models and notations to adequately model 
security aspects. Security is an important issue when 
developing complex information systems and the 
lack of models and notation to capture it, restricts 
the usefulness of a development methodology.  
However, so far very little work has taken place 
in integrating security and systems engineering. The 
common approach towards the inclusion of security 
within a system is to identify security requirements 
after the definition of a system. This approach has 
provoked the emergence of computer systems 
afflicted with security vulnerabilities (Stallings, 
1999). From the viewpoint of the traditional security 
paradigm, it should be possible to eliminate such 
problems through more extensive use of formal 
methods and better software engineering. 
We believe that security should be considered 
during the whole development process and it should 
be defined together with the requirements 
specification. By considering security only in certain 
stages of the development process, more likely, 
security needs will conflict with functional 
requirements of the system. Taking security into 
account along with the functional requirements 
throughout the development stages helps to limit the 
cases of conflict, by identifying them very early in 
the system development, and find ways to overcome 
them. On the other hand, adding security as an 
afterthought not only increases the chances of such a 
conflict to exist, but it requires huge amount of 
money and valuable time to overcome it, once they 
have been identified (usually a major rebuild of the 
system is needed).   
This paper introduces extensions to Tropos, to 
accommodate security concerns during the early 
requirements analysis. The proposed extensions are 
illustrated with the aid of a case study, the electronic 
Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system, a real-
life integrated health and social care information 
system for older people (Mouratidis, 2002b). The 
eSAP project is a joint research project, between the 
Computer Science Department and the Sheffield 
Institute for Studies on Ageing (SISA), both at the 
University of Sheffield, and it aims to deliver the 
Single Assessment Process, a national policy in 
England of an integrated assessment of health and 
social care needs of older people 
[www.doh.gov.uk/scg/sap/]. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents security concerns in software engineering. 
Section 3 introduces an extension to the Tropos 
methodology in order to accommodate security and 
in Section 4 such an extension is applied to the 
eSAP case study. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the 
contributions of the paper and points to further work. 
 
2 SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
AND SECURITY 
Software engineering considers security 
requirements, as well as performance and reliability 
requirements, as non-functional requirements. Non-
functional requirements represent the constraints 
under which the system must operate but also 
introduce quality characteristics to the system. 
Software designers have already recognised the 
importance of integrating non-functional 
requirements, such as performance and reliability, 
into software design processes (Lampson, 2000) 
however security requirements are still an 
afterthought.  
This typically means that security enforcement 
mechanisms have to be fitted into a pre-existing 
design therefore leading to serious design 
challenges, which usually translate into software 
vulnerabilities. Modern computer systems, 
applications and operating systems are full of 
security vulnerabilities in many levels therefore 
leading to the violation of the security policy. 
Adopting a security focus through the overall system 
development process represents a solution to 
mitigate such problems. 
There are at least two reasons for the lack of 
support for security engineering (Meadows, 1994). 
 The first reason is that security requirements are 
generally difficult to analyse and model. A second 
important reason is lack of developer acceptance and 
expertise for secure software development. For 
software developers, security interferes with features 
and time to market. Furthermore security policies 
are generally specified in terms of security models 
that are not integrated with general software 
engineering models. 
A major problem in analysing non-functional 
requirements is that there is a need to separate 
functional and non-functional requirements yet, at 
the same time, individual non-functional 
requirements may relate to one or more functional 
requirements. If the non-functional requirements are 
stated separately from the functional requirements, it 
is sometimes difficult to see the correspondence 
between them. If stated with the functional 
requirements, it may be difficult to separate 
functional and non-functional considerations. 
However, security is an important aspect in the 
development of complex computerised systems and 
according to Devanbu (Devanbu, 2000) “Security 
concerns must inform every phase of software 
development, from requirements engineering to 
design, implementation, testing and deployment”. 
The consideration of security in early software 
development stages will aid in the elimination of 
security vulnerabilities that are difficult and 
expensive to correct during later stages. 
3 MODELING SECURITY WITH 
TROPOS 
As mentioned above, Tropos has not been 
conceived with security on mind. Thus, we have 
extended Tropos, introducing concepts such as 
security constraint, secure dependency, and secure 
goal/ task/ resource in order to provide a systematic 
process that will guide the developer in considering 
security requirements during the whole development 
phases.  
Basically, security analysis consists of analysing 
the security needs in terms of security constraints, 
imposed to the system and the stakeholders, and of 
the identification of secure entities that can 
guarantee the satisfaction of such constraints. The 
analysis allows also for the identification of 
capabilities of the system in order to help towards 
the satisfaction of the secure entities. In this work, 
we focus manly in the integration of security 
analysis in the early requirement stage of the Tropos 
methodology.  
3.1 Security concepts  
Constraints can be categorised according to the 
non-functional requirement they are related to (e.g., 
reliability, performance or security constraints).  In 
this work we are interested in imposing to the 
system constraints that help towards the security of 
the system. We define security constraint as a 
constraint that is related to the security of the 
system.  
In the early requirements analysis security 
constraints are identified and analysed according to 
the constraint analysis processes we have proposed 
in (Mouratidis – 2002c). Security constraints are 
then imposed to different parts of the system, and 
possible conflicts between security and other 
(functional and non functional) requirements of the 
system are identified and solved. It is worth 
mentioning that we consider a security constraint 
contributing to a higher level of abstraction, 
meaning that a security constraint does not involve 
the identification of particular security protocols so 
that it does not restrict the development of the 
system to a specific security solution. This means we 
are not taking into consideration specific security 
protocols that should be decided during the 
implementation of the system, and that most of the 
times restrict the design with the use of a particular 
implementation language.  
A security constraint is represented graphically 
as shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. A graphical representation of a security 
constraint 
The term secure entities involves any secure 
goals, tasks and resources of the system. A secure 
entity is introduced to the actor (or the system) in 
order to help in the achievement of a security 
constraint. A secure goal does not particularly 
define how the security constraint can be achieved, 
since (as in the definition of goal, see (Yu, 1995)) 
alternatives can be considered. However, this is 
possible through a secure task, since a task specifies 
a way of doing something (Yu, 1995). Thus, a 
secure task represents a particular way for satisfying 
a secure goal. A resource that is related to a secure 
entity or a security constraint is considered a secure 
 resource. Secure Entities are represented graphically 
by introducing an S within brackets (S) before the 
text description as shown in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of secure entities (task, 
goal, and resource, respectively) 
 
A secure dependency introduces security 
constraint(s), proposed either by the depender (most 
likely) or the dependee (most unlikely) in order to 
successfully satisfy the dependency. For example a 
Doctor (depender) depends on a Patient (dependee) 
to obtain Health Information (dependum). However, 
the Patient imposes a security constraint to the 
Doctor to share health information only if consent is 
achieved. Both the depender and the dependee must 
agree in this constraint (or constraints) for the secure 
dependency to be valid. That means, in the depender 
side, the depender expects from the dependee to 
satisfy the security constraints while in the dependee 
side, a secure dependency means that the dependee 
will make an effort to deliver the dependum by 
satisfying the security constraint(s). There are two 
degrees of security: Open Secure dependency 
(normal dependency) and Secure dependency. In an 
Open Secure Dependency some security conditions 
might be introduced but if the dependee fail to 
satisfy them, the consequences will not be serious. 
This means that the security of the system will not 
be in danger if some of these conditions are not 
satisfied. An Open Secure Dependency is 
graphically represented (Figure 3-a) as unmarked (as 
the normal dependency).  On the other side, there are 
three different types of a secure dependency: 
− Dependee Secure Dependency, depender 
depends on dependee and dependee introduces 
security constraints for the dependency. 
Depender must satisfy the security constraints 
introduced by the dependee in order to help in 
the achievement of the secure dependency. This 
type of secure dependency is graphically 
represented with a constraint at the side of the 
depender (Figure 3-b). 
− Depender Secure Dependency, depender 
depends on dependee, and depender introduces 
security constraints for the dependency. The 
dependee must satisfy the security constraints 
introduced by the depender, otherwise the 
security of the dependency will be in risk. This 
type of secure dependency is graphically 
represented with a constraint at the side of the 
dependee (Figure 3-c). 
− Double Secure Dependency, depender depends 
on dependee and both depender and dependee 
introduce security constraints for the 
dependency. Both must satisfy the security 
constraints introduced to achieve the secure 
dependency. This type of secure dependency is 
represented with constraints on both sides 
(Figure 3-d). 
 
Figure 3. The Different Types of Secure 
Dependencies 
3.2 Formal Tropos 
Formal Tropos (Fuxman, 2001) complements 
graphical Tropos by extending the Tropos graphical 
language into a formal specification language 
(Fuxman, 2001). The language offers all the 
primitive concepts of graphical Tropos, 
supplemented with a rich temporal specification 
language, inspired by KAOS (Dardenne, 1993), that 
has formal semantics and it is amenable to formal 
analysis. In addition, Formal Tropos offers a textual 
notation for i* models and allows the description of 
different elements of the specification in a first order 
linear-time temporal logic.  A specification of 
formal Tropos consists of a sequence of declarations 
of entities, actors, and dependencies (Fuxman, 
2001). 
Formal Tropos can be used to perform a formal 
analysis of the system and also verify the model of 
 the system by employing formal verification 
techniques such as model checking to allow for an 
automatic verification of the system properties 
(Fuxman, 2001). 
As with the graphical Tropos, Formal Tropos has 
not been conceived with security on mind. Thus we 
felt that extending Formal Tropos was the next 
natural step in our security extensions for two 
reasons. Firstly, formal Tropos fails to adequately 
model some security aspects (such as secure 
dependencies and security constraints), and secondly 
formal Tropos allows the formal analysis of our 
introduced concepts and thus provides formalism to 
our approach. Towards this direction, we have 
extended Formal Tropos grammar as shown below 
(bold letters indicate the extensions). 
 
entity:= Entity name [attributes] [creation-
properties] [invar-properties] [security-properties] 
 
actor:= Actor name [attributes] [creation-
properties] [ invar-properties] [security-properties] 
[actor-goals] 
 
dependency:= Dependency name type security-
type mode Depender name Dependee name 
[attributes] [creation-properties] [invar-properties] [ 
fulfil-properties] [security-properties] 
 
security-type:= security type (Depender 
|Dependee |Double |Open Secure) 
 
security-properties:= Security security-
property+ 
 
security-property:= Constraint property-
origin temporal-formula 
4 THE ESAP EXAMPLE 
In the early requirements analysis the goals and 
the dependencies between the stakeholders (actors) 
are modelled. For this purpose Tropos introduces 
actor diagrams. In such a diagram each node 
represents an actor, and the links between the 
different actors indicate that one depends on the 
other to accomplish some goals. In addition, security 
constraints are imposed to the stakeholders of the 
system (by other stakeholders). These constraints are 
analysed and security entities are introduced.  
In the case of the eSAP system, we have four 
actors (Figure 4): 
 
 Older Person: The Older Person that 
wishes to receive appropriate health and 
social care (patient) 
 Professional: The health and/or social care 
professional 
 DoH: The English Department of Health 
 Benefits Agency: An agency that helps the 
older person financially 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Actor diagram of the eSAP including security 
constraints 
Figure 4 illustrates part of the actor diagram of 
the eSAP system taking into consideration security 
constraints that are imposed to the stakeholders of 
the system. 
The Older Person depends on the Benefits 
Agency to Receive Financial Support. However, the 
Older Person worries about the privacy of their 
finances so they impose a constraint to the Benefits 
Agency actor, to keep their financial information 
private. The Professional depends on the Older 
Person to Obtain Information, however one of the 
most important and delicate matters for a patient (in 
our case the older person) is the privacy of their 
personal medical information, and the sharing of it. 
Thus most of the times the Professional is imposed a 
constraint to share this information if and only if 
consent is achieved.  In addition, one of the main 
goals of the R&D Agency is to Obtain Clinical 
Information in order to perform tests and research. 
To get this information the R&D Agency depends on 
the Professional. However, the Professional is 
imposed a constraint (by the Department of Health) 
to Keep Patient Anonymity.   
 In addition, the security constraints imposed at 
each actor are further analysed by identifying which 
goals of the actor they restrict (Figure 5). The 
assignment of a security constraint to a goal is 
indicated using a constraint link (a link that has the 
“restricts” tag). For example, the Professional actor 
has been imposed two security constraints (Share 
Info Only If Consent Achieved and Keep Patient 
Anonymity). During the means-end analysis of the 
Professional actor we have identified the Share 
Medical Info goal. However, this goal is restricted 
by the Share Info Only If Consent Achieved 
constraint imposed to the Professional by the Older 
Person. For the Professional to satisfy the 
constraint, a secure goal is introduced Obtain Older 
Person Consent. However this goal can be achieved 
with many different ways, for example a 
Professional can obtain the consent personally or 
can ask a nurse to obtain the consent on their behalf. 
Thus a sub-constraint is introduced, Only Obtain 
Consent Personally. This sub constraint introduces 
another secure goal Personally Obtain Consent. 
This goal is divided into two sub-tasks Obtain 
Consent by Mail or Obtain Consent by Phone.  
The Professional has also a goal to Provide 
Medical Information for Research. However, the 
constraint Keep Patient Anonymity has been 
imposed to the Professional, which restricts the 
Provide Medical Information for Research goal. As 
a result of this constraint a secure goal is introduced 
to the Professional, Provide Only anonymous Info. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
In this paper we have presented extensions to the 
early requirements stage of the Tropos methodology. 
Security related concepts and notations were 
introduced to the existing Tropos concepts in order 
to allow the modelling of security concerns during 
the early requirements stage. In addition, to provide 
formalism for our newly introduced concepts, we 
have extended Formal Tropos, a specification 
language amenable to formal analysis.  
During the process of extending Tropos it was 
concluded that Tropos methodology facilitates the 
consideration of security requirements for different 
reasons: 
 
− By considering the overall software 
development process it is easy to identify 
security requirements at the early requirements 
stage and propagate them until the 
implementation stage. This introduces a 
security-oriented paradigm to the software 
engineering process. 
− Tropos allows a hierarchical approach towards 
security. Security would be defined in different 
levels of complexity, which will allow the 
software engineer a better understanding while 
advancing through the process. 
− Iteration allows the re-definition of security 
requirements in different levels therefore 
providing a better integration with system 
functionality. 
− Consideration of the organisational environment 
facilitates the understanding of the security 
needs in terms of the security policy. 
Functional and non-functional requirements are 
defined together however a clear distinction is 
provided. 
As mentioned above the proposed extensions 
apply only on the early requirements stage of the 
methodology. However, our aim is to provide a clear 
well guided process of integrating security and 
functional requirements throughout the whole range 
of the development stages. Such a process must use 
the same concepts and notations throughout the 
development phases. 
Thus, future work involves the assignment of 
capabilities to the system to help towards the 
satisfaction of the secure entities, and verify the 
security of the system by analysing potential attacks 
and if necessary introduce extra secure capabilities. 
Then, the design of the system will take place by 
taking into consideration the security analysis 
performed in the previous stages.  
In addition, we are constantly refining and checking 
the identified concepts, notations, and process by 
applying them to different real life examples in order 
to justify them. 
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